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i 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY AWARDING 
DEFENDANT RIGHTS OF VISITATION WITHOUT 
SUPERVISION IN CONTRADICTION TO THE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE COURT, 
The Appellant argues 
r e recommendations appointed 
expert, Dr. Mercedes Reisingei , oi the children's therapist, Thomas 
Harrison. However, the i 11 1 v 
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when weighing the evidence is the preponderance of evidence. Dr. 
Reisinger's report was admitted without objection or cross-
examination and is the preponderance of evidence. Further, Mr. 
Harrison testified that Appellant is in need of significant 
treatment individually and is in need of treatment with his 
children conjointly before he should be allowed to visit them 
without supervision. [Transcript 664] Mr. Harrison further 
testified that he believed there is a potential for danger to the 
children if visitation occurred without supervision. [Transcript 
665] 
The Appellee argues in his Reply Brief of Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee, page 15, that the Court had the opportunity to 
observe Kathryn Coats in her testimony and, based upon that 
observation, the lower Court was justified in ignoring the 
preponderance of evidence and awarding the Defendant rights of 
visitation without supervision. 
The lower Court made a finding that "there is concern 
about the father's dysfunction and the mother informing the 
children of this dysfunction." [Findings of Fact No. 2, pages 2 
and 3] However, this issue was addressed by Dr. Mercedes Reisinger 
as follows: 
The children appear to derive the problems as 
outlined as a result of three primary factors: 
(1) there are no emotional problems to varying 
degrees; (2) their father has serious 
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personality problems which foster his 
aggressive insistence on changing the 
visitation without resolution of the existing 
conflicts. Mr. Coats tends to be disregarding 
of the children's needs due to his own strong 
emotional needs. He has difficulty 
interacting with them without disclosing too 
much information and is unable to remain in 
parental control of the interactions. (3) 
their mother's own overly dramatic and overly 
reactive personality style with her overly 
candid approach in relation to the children 
and the conflicts that have existed with their 
father in terms of the information which Mrs. 
Coats reportedly discussed with the children, 
it appears that it reflects her own fears in 
relation to her ex-husband. It seems that 
Mrs. Coats' approach towards the children has 
occurred as a result of her misrepresentation 
of what Mr. Tom Harrison counseled in 
combination with her personality style. As a 
result of these factors, the children in this 
case are being placed in the middle of adult 
conflicts which they have inadequate skills 
coping with. This exacerbates the children's 
emotional problems. [P-14] 
And, even after considering the shortcomings of Kathryn 
Coats, Dr. Reisinger still recommends that Defendant have 
supervised visitation. 
The Appellant argues that now the children reside in 
Virginia, the Appellant is only able to see them on an infrequent 
occasion and this limited time together is an additional reason to 
allow unsupervised visits so that he can attempt to rebuild his 
relationship with his children. [Reply Brief of Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee, page 16] However, since the Appellant only sees 
the children on an infrequent occasion, this supports the position 
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that visitation should be supervised, as the Appellant and the 
children have not had the opportunity to rebuild a healthy and 
positive relationship. The lower Court made the finding that the 
children do have fear toward their father [Findings of Fact, page 
2] and Appellant's infrequent visitation clearly does not alleviate 
the children's fear. 
It is clear that by not following the recommendations of 
the experts, the lower Court ignored the statutory standard of 
allowing visitation which is in the best interests of the child. 
The matter should be remanded with instructions to follow the 
recommendations of the experts. 
II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING THE 
PLAINTIFF TO REPLACE MR. TOM HARRISON WITH 
ANOTHER COUNSELOR AS THE CHILDREN'S COUNSELOR. 
The Appellant argues that the lower Court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that another counselor would be more 
appropriate. The Appellant argues that if antagonism existed 
between the counselor and the Appellant, a non-productive session 
would result. [Reply Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellant, page 
17] Appellant ignores the fact that Mr. Harrison had been treating 
the children for almost two years and that Dr. Mercedes Reisinger 
recommended that the children should continue therapy with Tom 
Harrison. Both the Appellant and the lower Court failed to take 
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into consideration the best interests of the child and only 
considered the interest of the Appellant. This matter should be 
reversed. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING 
THAT ALIMONY WOULD TERMINATE TEN YEARS FROM 
THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT WHICH WAS JUNE 16, 
1992. 
The Appellant argues that with the substantial property 
award given to the Appellee by the Court together with her age and 
earning ability, an award of $240,000 over a ten-year period cannot 
be said to be an abuse of discretion. [Reply Brief of Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee] However, the Appellant ignores the fact that 
these parties were married over thirteen years constituting a long-
term marriage. The Appellant's argument also fails to recognize 
the Court's decision in Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 
1992), wherein the Court upheld an award of permanent alimony based 
upon a six-year marriage in a factually similar case. 
The Appellant further argues that based on Appellee's 
remarriage in the summer of 1993, the issue would be moot and not 
be subject to appellate review. However, the Appellee has filed 
for an annulment, and pursuant to 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Annotated. 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio. 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made 
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a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
Thus, the issue is not moot and is subject to appellate review. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY VALUING 
NORTHRIDGE FURNISHINGS AT $4,500 EVEN THOUGH 
THE DEFENDANT TESTIFIED THAT THE VALUE OF SAID 
PROPERTY WAS $18,000. 
The Appellant argues that based upon the testimony of 
Appellee's own appraiser, John Davis, the lower Court was justified 
in concluding that the retail value suggested by the Appellant was 
only approximately one-fourth of the actual market value that these 
items would sell for in a commercial setting. [Reply Brief of 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, page 21] However, the lower Court 
did not rely upon the testimony of John Davis when making its 
ruling on the Northridge property. The only evidence before the 
Court was the testimony of the Appellant valuing the Northridge 
furnishings at $18,000 [TR 456] which is clearly the preponderance 
of evidence. The Court was clearly in error by arbitrarily 
reducing the amount from $18,000 to $4,500. The case should be 
reversed with instructions that the value of the Northridge 
personal property is $18,000. 
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V. 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ELIMINATING 
TARGET CAPITOL AS AN ASSET EVEN THOUGH THE 
PARTIES STIPULATED THAT IT WAS AN ASSET. 
The Appellant argues that the lower Court was correct in 
completely discarding Target Capitol as a non-existent asset. 
However, even though there was no testimony regarding this asset, 
the parties agreed that Target Capitol was an asset of the marital 
estate and agreed on its value. [Exhibits D-59 and P-91] 
The Court refused to include Target Capitol in the 
marital estate, and the case should be reversed on this issue with 
instructions to set the value stipulated by the parties and include 
Target Capitol as an asset of the marriage which is awarded to 
Defendant• 
VI. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF TO HER 
FATHER WHICH WAS INCURRED DURING THE DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES, EXPERT 
FEES AND TO MAINTAIN THE FAMILY. 
The Appellant makes the argument that the Appellee wishes 
the Appellant to pay the entire liability to her father and then to 
pay her separately for attorney's fees and witness fees which she 
claims are due. The Appellant claims that such double-dipping 
cannot be allowed. [Reply Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee, 
page 21] However, Appellant mischaracterizes the argument raised 
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in the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant which specifically 
states at pages 42 and 43, that when determining the issue of the 
liability owed to Mr. Tuck, the Court must also consider the sub-
sections of that Brief relating to attorney's fees and costs. 
Consequently, Appellee is not double-dipping as the Appellant has 
suggested. The Appellant also fails to recognize the argument made 
by Appellee in her Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant, pages 
42 and 43. Appellee is not making the argument that Mr. Tuck has 
a direct claim against Mr. Coats for payment of the Promissory 
Notes. Rather, that the lower Court failed to recognize the entire 
liability owed by Plaintiff to her father, which was incurred 
during the divorce proceedings to pay attorney's fees, Muir v. 
Muir, 847 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992), expert witness fees, Peterson 
v. Peterson 818 P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991), and to maintain 
the family. The Court was clearly in error by failing to recognize 
the undisputed liability owed to Mr. Tuck, and the case should be 
reversed with instructions to recognize the liability owed to Mr. 
Tuck. 
VII. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD THE 
PLAINTIFF ALL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
INCURRED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
The Appellant argues that the Court took into account the 
financial need of the receiving spouse and the ability of the other 
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spouse to pay, together with the conduct of both spouses in 
generating the fees, and correctly awarded the Appellee only 
$20,000 in attorney's fees. However, the Court ignores Martindale 
v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-518 (Utah App. 1989) which states that 
"where the evidence supporting the reasonableness of the requested 
fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed...the court abuses 
its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless 
the reduction is warranted by one or more of the established 
factors." [emphasis added] The Court offered no explanation for 
the reduction in fees. Because the evidence of Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees is adequate and entirely undisputed, the Court 
abused its discretion. All of the fees paid by the Plaintiff's 
father and all the fees incurred for the trial should be awarded to 
the Plaintiff. 
VIII. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD THE 
PLAINTIFF REASONABLE FEES FOR EXPERTS. I.E.. 
ACCOUNTANTS. APPRAISERS. ENGINEER AND OTHER 
EXPERTS WHO APPEARED ON HER BEHALF AND 
ASSISTED HER IN THE PREPARATION AND 
PRESENTATION OF HER CASE. 
The Appellant argues that the lower Court denied 
Appellee's request for expert witness fees on the basis that her 
request was overly broad under Utah law. However, this argument is 
unsupported by the record. The Judge stated from the bench that he 
was not going to award fees because he was not persuaded that 
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Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), applied to 
professional experts such as accountants. [TR 506] However, it is 
clear that the Court misapplied the holding in Peterson as it 
clearly states that Utah Code Annotated. § 30-3-3, "empowers a 
court to use its sound discretion to define costs as those 
reasonable amounts that are reasonably expended to prosecute or 
defend a divorce action." [emphasis added] In Rappleve v. 
Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993), Mrs. Rappleye sought 
reimbursement of accounting costs that had been incurred in 
prosecuting the divorce. The trial Court rejected her claim. The 
lower Court's determination was vacated and the matter remanded for 
further findings regarding the propriety of awarding accounting 
costs to Mrs. Rappleye under Utah Code Annotated. § 30-3-3 (1989). 
The Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
before the Court to justify such fees. However, the Plaintiff 
testified that she incurred expert fees in the case and it was her 
desire to be awarded 100% of those expert fees. [TR 780-781] She 
further testified that experts in this case were necessary because 
of Defendant's failure to cooperate in discovery, valuation of the 
assets, and payment of support. [TR 778-779] Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 30-3-3, requires that fees and costs be awarded pursuant to need 
and ability to pay. As such, the statutory requirements of § 30-3-
3 were satisfied, and the lower Court's decision to deny expert 
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fees in this case should be reversed and the Court instructed to 
award $14,200 in expert fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has failed to refute any of the arguments 
presented to this Court for review. Consequently, the Court 
committed error: 
a. By awarding Defendant rights of visitation 
without supervision in contradiction to the expert testimony 
presented to the Court. 
b. Directing the Plaintiff to replace Mr. Thomas 
Harrison with another counselor as the children's counselor when 
Dr. Reisinger recommended that the children continue in therapy 
with Mr. Harrison had been treating the children for almost two 
years. 
c. Directing that alimony would terminate in ten 
years when in fact this marriage constituted a long-term marriage 
that should have resulted in an award of permanent alimony. 
d. Valuing the Northridge furnishings at $4,500 
even though the only evidence before the Court was Defendant's 
testimony that the value of said property was $18,000. 
e. Eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the 
marital estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset. 
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£• Failing to recognize the entire liability of 
the Plaintiff to her father which was incurred during the divorce 
proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and to 
maintain the family. 
g. Failing to award the Plaintiff all attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in these proceedings. 
h. Failing to award the Plaintiff reasonable fees 
for experts, i.e., accountants, engineers, appraisers, and other 
experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted her in the 
preparation and presentation of the case. 
DATED this day of April, 1994. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
'JOANNA B. SAGERS 
;to^ney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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